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Reconsidering the Law of Countervailing Duties:
United States v. Zenith Radio Corporation
The United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals' decision
in United States v. Zenith Radio Corporation' dealt with the question of
whether remission of a Japanese commodity tax on electronic products
imported to the United States constitutes a "bounty" or "grant" requir-
ing the levy of countervailing duties pursuant to section 303 of the Tariff
Act of 1930.2 Zenith alleged that Japan's imposition of the tax on a
manufacturer's shipment of electronic parts for consumption in Japan
while refusing to apply it to shipments for exports constituted such a
bounty or grant. In overruling the United States Customs Court's hold-
ing for Zenith, 3 the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals affirmed a
long-standing Treasury Department interpretation of section 303 requir-
ing that there be an excessive remission of an excise tax to justify the
application of countervailing duties.
The Japanese Commodity Tax Law imposed a single stage con-
sumption tax at the manufacturing level on an extensive list of consumer
goods, including various electronic products. 4 Tax rates ranged from
five to forty percent of the manufacturer's sales price.5 Upon the expor-
1 562 F.2d 1209 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
2 Section 303 provides, in relevant part, that:
whenever any country, ... province, ... or other political subdivision of
government ... shall pay or bestow, directly or indirectly, any bounty or
grant upon the manufacture or production or export of any article or mer-
chandise manufactured or produced in such country, ... province, or other
political subdivision of government, (and such article or merchandise is duti-
able) ... then upon the importation of any such article or merchandise into
the United States... there shall be levied and paid, in all such cases, in
addition to any duties otherwise imposed a duty equal to the net amount
of such bounty or grant ...
19 U.S.C. § 1303 (Supp. 1975).
3 430 F. Supp. 242 (Cust. Ct. 1977).
4 The products included: television receivers, radio receivers, radio-phonograph
combinations, radio-television-phonograph combinations, radio-tape recorder combina-
tions, tape players, record players and phonographs complete with amplifiers and speak-
ers, tape recorders, and television receiver parts. 37 Fed. Reg. 10,087 (1972), as amended
37 Fed. Reg. 11,487 (1972).
5 A. ANDERSON & Co., TAX AND TRADE GUIDE, JAPAN 140 (1968).
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tation of these products from Japan, either the tax was remitted if previ-
ously paid or payment was waived altogether.
In 1970 Zenith Radio Corporation, a domestic manufacturer of elec-
tronic products of the type involved in the Japanese tax scheme,
petitioned the U.S. Secretary of the Treasury alleging that the exemp-
tion from or refund of the commodity tax for exports under the Japanese
Commodity Tax Law constituted the payment or bestowal of bounties or
grants. Zenith further alleged that these products, when imported into
the United States, fall within section 303 of the Tariff Act of 1930 requir-
ing the imposition of countervailing, duties. On January 7, 1976, the
Acting Commissioner of Customs, with the approval of the Acting As-
sistant Secretary of the Treasury, published a "Final Negative Counter-
vailing Duty Determination" 6 which concluded that "no bounty or grant
is being paid or bestowed, directly or indirectly, within the meaning of
section 303, Tariff Act of 1930... upon the manufacturer [sic], produc-
tion, or exportation of certain consumer electronic products from
Japan." '7
Zenith, pursuant to section 516(d) of the Trade Act of 1974,8 insti-
tuted an action in the United States Customs Court for review of the
commissioner's determination. This court held as a matter of law that
remission of the Japanese commodity tax constituted a bounty or grant
under section 303. 9 Accordingly, the court granted Zenith's motion for
summary judgment and directed the Secretary of the Treasury to "ascer-
tain and determine ... the net amounts of the bounty or grant paid or
bestowed."' 1 Furthermore, the Secretary must order the assessment of
countervailing duties in amounts equal to the estimated bounties. The
United States appealed from this judgment.
I. Legislative History of the Countervailing Duty Law
The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals based its decision in
Zenith upon a careful examination of the statutory evolution and his-
torical interpretation of the countervailing duty law. Therefore, an
understanding of the legislative history, administrative application
and judicial interpretation underlying the statute is necessary before
the Zenith opinion can be fully evaluated.
6 41 Fed. Reg. 1298 (1976).
7 Id.
8 19 U.S.C. § 1516(d) (Supp. 1975). Section 516(d), as amended, empowers the
United States Customs Court to review, at the instance of U. S. manufacturers, producers,
or wholesalers, negative countervailing duty determinations made by the Secretary of the
Treasury under 19 U.S.C.A. § 1303 relative to the existence of a bounty or grant on
merchandise exported to the United States.
9 430 F. Supp. at 244.
'
0 Id. at 265.
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Countervailing duties were first imposed under the Tariff Acts of
189011 and 189412 to protect the United States sugar industry from
foreign subsidized imports. 13 The Acts applied to sugar and sugar prod-
ucts "which are imported from or are the product of any country which
at the time the same are exported therefrom pays, directly or indirectly,
a bounty on the export thereof. .. ,14 The legislation imposed the coun-
tervailing duty in addition to all other duties already levied, but, under
the 1894 statute, the former could be avoided if the importer "produces a
certificate of said government stating that no indirect bounty has been
received upon said sugar in excess of the tax collected upon the beet or
cane from which it was produced, and that no direct bounty has been or
shall be paid."115 The statute thus specifically exempted nonexcessive
drawbacks 16 on the exported sugar, yet exempted no direct subsidies.
Congress failed to incorporate this exception for nonexcessive tax
remissions into the countervailing duty provisions in section 5 of the
Tariff Act of 1897.17 However, this Act expanded the coverage of coun-
tervailing duties to all dutiable imports and required the Secretary of the
Treasury to determine the amount of the "bounty or grant" bestowed
upon the exportation of any article and then to assess a duty "equal to
the net amount of such bounty or grant." 18
The essential purpose of the 1897 countervailing duty law was to
fortify and supplement the existing U. S. tariff barriers. 19 "Protectionist"
philosophy dominated trade policies at that time, and foreign export
subsidies were regarded by the legislators as a means for exporters to
circumvent the U.S. tariff wall by lowering costs and prices for their
exported goods. 20 Countervailing duties neutralized the effect of these
subsidies. Consequently, section 5 did not require proof of injury to
domestic manufacturers, since the very existence of a tariff against the
countervailed good created a presumption of injury or threat thereof
to the domestic industry. Conversely, the absence of a good from the
dutiable list indicated that little or no potential for injury existed,
thus obviating the need for a countervailing duty or any other form
of protection.
I1 Ch. 1244, § 237, 26 Stat. 584 (1890) [hereinafter cited as 1890 Tariffl.
12 Ch. 349, § 1821/2, 28 Stat. 521 (1894) [hereinafter cited as 1894 Tariff].
13 Feller, Mutiny Against the Bounty: An Examination of Subsidies, Border Tax Adjustments,
and the Resurgence of the Countervailing Duty Law, 1 LAw & POL. INT'L BUS. 17, 21-22 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as Feller].
14 1890 Tariff, supra note 11 and 1894 Tariff, supra note 12.
is 1894 Tariff, supra note 12.
16 A drawback is a reimbursement to the exporter for the import duties paid upon raw
materials going into the finished product. BLACK'S LAw DiCTIONARY 583 (4th ed. 1968).
' Ch. 11, § 5, 30 Stat. 205 (1897).
18 Id.
19 Feller, supra note 13, at 21-22.
20 Id. at 22.
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The Tariff Acts of 190921 and 191322 incorporated the provisions of
section 5 without change. The Tariff Act of 1922,23 however, extended
the coverage of countervailing duties to bounties or grants upon the
"manufacture or production" as well as the exportation of foreign
goods.24 This amendment prevented circumvention of the law and re-
sulted in the application of countervailing duties to all subsidized ex-
ports regardless of the policies underlying the exporting government's
actions. This new law further proscribed export subsidies granted by
private concerns. 25
Section 303 of the Tariff Act of 193026 embodied essentially the same
provision as the 1922 law, with the exception of a provision allowing the
Secretary of the Treasury to "estimate" the amount of the bounty or
grant to be assessed. As a consequence of the Secretary's broad discre-
tion in this area, courts have been hesitant to review administrative
determinations as to the amount of a subsidy. 27
Section 331 of the Trade Act of 197428 amended section 303 and
strengthened the administration of the countervailing duty law in re-
sponse to considerable criticism of the existing legislation. 29 Here the
legislators showed concern for the delays and inefficiencies in the ad-
ministration of the existing legislation as well as a desire to preserve
U.S. interests in anticipated world trade negotiations. Congress de-
signed the amendments "to balance the need for assuring effective pro-
tection of domestic interests from foreign subsidies, on the one hand,
with the need to afford some flexibility in the application of the United
States law."'30
The prior law contained no provision requiring the Secretary to
initiate an investigation within a particular time following the filing of a
complaint. As a result, section 303 of the amended act allows the Secre-
tary only six months from the filing date to make a preliminary determi-
nation and an additional six months to make a final determination on a
petition claiming that a bounty or grant is being paid or bestowed. 31 The
Secretary retains the right to determine whether the petition warrants a
21 Ch. 6, § 6, 36 Stat. 85 (1909).
22 Ch. 16, § 4 (E), 38 Stat. 193 (1913).
23 Ch. 356, § 303, 42 Stat. 935 (1922) [hereinafter cited as 1922 Tariff].
24 See text at note 19, supra.
2- The statute provides that "whenever any country, dependency, colony, province,
or other political subdivision of government, person, partnership, association, cartel, or
corporation shall pay or bestow..." 1922 Tariff, supra note 23.
26 Ch. 497, § 303, 46 Stat. 687 (1930) (current version at 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (Supp. 1975))
27 See, e.g., American Express Co. v. United States, 332 F. Supp. 191, 196 (Cust. Ct.
1971).
28 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (Supp. 1975).
29 See S. REP. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 183, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 7186, 7318.
30 Id.
31 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (a)(4) (Supp. 1975).
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formal investigation. 32 However, once he has decided to proceed, a
notice of the investigation is published in the Federal Register and the
Secretary must act subject to the applicable time limitations. 33 As a
result, this provision precludes the Treasury Department from any ten-
dency to "stretch out or even shelve countervailing duty investigations"
for arbitrary reasons. 3
4
Amended section 303(b) extends the application of countervailing
duties to duty-free articles provided the International Trade Commis-
sion determines that "an industry in the United States is being or is
likely to be injured, or is prevented from being established, by reason of
the importation of such article or merchandise into the United States." 35
This injury test as applied to non-dutiable imports is compelled by Arti-
cle VI of the GATT36 which requires a finding of "material" injury to a
domestic industry before countervailing duties can be levied. 37
The Trade Act of 1974 further strengthened the effectiveness of the
countervailing duty law by allowing U.S. manufacturers, producers
and wholesalers to seek judicial review. Section 516(b) of the 1930 Act 38
permitted the domestic manufacturer the right of review only with re-
spect to "the classification of, or rate of duty assessed" 39 upon the im-
ported article. A 1971 Court of Customs and Patent Appeals decision 40
interpreted this language as indicating that section 516(b) applied only
to duties regularly assessed under the Tariff Schedules and not to the
assessment of special or additional duties. The domestic manufacturer
thus could not appeal a Treasury determination against the assessment
of a countervailing duty. Consequently section 516, as amended, 4 1 now
provides that "such manufacturer, producer or wholesaler may com-
32 Id. § 1303(a)(3)(B).
33 Id.
34 S. REP. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 183, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONC. &
AD. NEws 7186, 7318.
35 19 U.S.C. § 1303(b)(1)(A) (Supp. 1975).
36 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A124, T.l.A.S. No.
1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194. The GATT is a multilateral international treaty "directed to the
substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade and to the elimination of
discriminatory treatment in international commerce..." 61 Stat. at All.
37 See S. REP. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 185, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG.
AD. NEWs 7186, 7320. Section 303 of the Trade Act of 1930 contains no injury test for
dutiable goods. None is required under Article VI of the GATT for countervailing duty
provisions predating the GATT. This exception is known as the "grandfather clause." Id.
at 7320.
38 19 U.S.C. § 1516(b) (1930).
39 Id,
40 United States v. Hammond Lead Products, Inc., 440 F.2d 1024 (C.C.P.A. 1971), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971).
41 19 U.S.C. § 1516 (Supp. 1975).
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mence an action in the United States Customs Court contesting such
determination. "42
II. Enforcement and Interpretation
Although Congress has recently permitted greater access to the
courts in countervailing duty cases, administrative practice and judicial
interpretation have not yielded clear guidelines for resolving counter-
vailing duty questions. The Treasury Department decisions, though
consistent, have been extremely restrictive. The courts have often
disagreed with the Treasury's interpretation of the law, but have
consistently upheld its decisions. The confusion that existed in the
countervailing duty law before Zenith largely resulted from this
judicial ambiguity. Nevertheless, the Zenith court attempted to resolve
this confusion in reaching its decision.
Responsibility for the administration of the countervailing duty law
rests with the Customs Service and the Commissioner of Customs 43
under authority delegated by the Secretary of the Treasury. 44 The
Commissioner initiates an investigation, if warranted by the cir-
cumstances, upon the receipt of appropriate information 45 from either
within the Customs Service4 6 or "any person ... who has reason to
believe that any bounty or grant is being paid or bestowed" 47 upon
imported goods. A notice in the Federal Register announces the investi-
gation and solicits further information and comments. 4 8 On the basis of
the comments received and other data, the Commissioner then deter-
mines the applicability of section 303 to the situation at hand. A positive
determination requires the issuance, with the approval of the Secretary
of the Treasury, of a countervailing duty order which describes the
merchandise, designates the exporting country, and declares the "ascer-
tained or estimated" amount of the bounty or grant. 4 9
Orders issued pursuant to positive determinations declare only the
amount of the bounty or grant without any further explanation of the
basis for the decision. This absence of a regulatory provision requiring
the Customs Service to state its reasons behind countervailing duty
determinations hinders any attempt to attach a meaning to the words
"bounty or grant."5 0 Nevertheless, examination of Treasury decisions
applying the Trade Act to foreign tax remissions and customs duty
drawbacks does yield some insight into the administrative definition.
42 19 U.S.C. § 1516(d)(2) (Supp. 1975).
43 19 C.F.R. § 159.47 (1977).
44 19 C.F.R. § 1.1 (1977).
45 19 C.F.R. § 159.47(c) (1977).
46 19 C.F.R. § 159.47(a) (1977).
47 19 C.F.R. § 159.47(b)(1) (1977).
48 19 C.F.R. § 159.47(c) (1977).
49 19 C.F.R. § 159.47(d) (1977).
50 See Feller, supra note 13, at 39.
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Rebates, remissions, and drawbacks exceeding the exporter's domestic
tax liability actually constitute forms of subsidies against which the
Treasury has generally countervailed. 5 ' Furthermore, prior to Zenith,
"nonexcessive" tax remissions had long been considered harmless and
consequently not subject to countervailing duties.
Judicial review of administrative practice has yielded equally am-
biguous interpretations. Both commentators5 2 and the courts5 3 rely
primarily on two relatively old Supreme Court decisions in evaluating
the existing case law.
Downs v. United States5 4 involved an elaborate two-part scheme
whereby the Russian government subsidized the exportation of sugar.
The government imposed a "normal" excise tax upon the production of
sugar up to a predetermined quantity, above which the tax doubled,
thus discouraging over-production. However the double tax applied
only to sugar sold domestically, and exportation of the sugar entitled the
exporter to remission of the normal tax. In addition, the exporter re-
ceived a certificate permitting him to transfer a quantity of domestic
sugar, equal to that which he had exported, from the high tax bracket to
the low. The certificate was marketable for a price equalling the differ-
ence in tax rates, and consequently the exporter received a subsidy in
excess of the tax remission.
The opinion in Downs did not clearly specify whether the tax remis-
sion, the certificate, or both were the bounty or grant being counter-
vailed. Although upholding the Treasury's decision to countervail the
certificates alone,5 - the Court was limited to the narrow issue of whether
an "excessive" remission constituted a bounty or grant. However, much
of the opinion also discussed "nonexcessive" remissions in the context
of defining "bounty or grant."5 6
Nicholas v. United States5 7 involved similar problems of interpreta-
tion. Here, British distillers exporting certain specified liquors received
not only a remission of domestic excise taxes on those exports, but also
an "allowance" of three to five pence per gallon exported. The importers
claimed that this allowance was not a bounty upon exportation but
rather compensation to the distillers for the added costs of production
due to excise tax restrictions on the manufacturing inputs. However, the
51 See, e.g., T.D. 43634, 56 TREAS. DEC. INT. REV. 342 (1929); T.D. 42895, 54 TREAS. DEC.
INT. REV. 101 (1928); T.D. 34466, 26 TREAS. DEC. INT. REV. 825 (1914).
52 See Feller, supra note 13; King, Countervailing Duties-An Old Remedy with a New
Appeal, 24 Bus. LAw. 1179 (1969).
53 See, American Express Co. v. United States, 332 F. Supp. 191 (Cust. Ct., 1971), affd
on other grounds, 472 F.2d 1050 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
54 187 U.S. 496 (1903).
55 T.D. 22 984, 4 TREAS. DEC. INT. REV. 405 (1901).
56 "When a tax is imposed upon all sugar produced, but is remitted upon all sugar
exported, then, by whatever process, or in whatever manner, or under whatever name it is
diguised, it is a bounty upon exportation." 187 U.S. at 515.
5 249 U.S. 34 (1919).
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Supreme Court ruled this drawback to be a bounty and upheld the
Treasury Department's decision to countervail to the full extent of the
allowance alone.58
As in Downs, the Nicholas court faced a limited question because the
Treasury had not countervailed the excise tax remission. Nevertheless,
the opinion discussed "bounty or grant" in broad terms,5 9 perhaps in-
tending to avoid any limitations being placed on the law by subsequent
interpretation. Accordingly, the Supreme Court in both Downs and
Nicholas made obvious attempts to incorporate nonexcessive tax remis-
sions and drawbacks into the scope of the countervailing duty law. Yet
in both cases the Treasury had countervailed only remissions in excess
of the exporters' original tax liability. Consequently, any language of the
opinions defining "bounty or grant" in broader terms is arguably
dictum.60
Prior to the 1974 Trade Act amendments, only importers of sub-
sidized goods could seek judicial review of Treasury determinations.
The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals' decision in United States v.
Hammond Lead Products, Inc. 61 precluded like review for domestic man-
ufacturers who competed with those subsidized goods. Since a negative
countervailing duty determination issued by the Treasury could not be
effectively challenged, the issue of whether a nonexcessive tax remission
constitutes a bounty or grant had never been squarely faced by the
courts prior to Zenith.
III. The Zenith Decision
Zenith represents the first instance in which a U.S. manufacturer
successfully obtained judicial review of a negative countervailing duty
determination. The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals ruled that
"nothing in section 303, or in its legislative history, requires that the
remission of an excise tax alone must be deemed a bounty or grant as a
matter of law."' 62 Furthermore, the court held that the administrative
practice of the Treasury Department must stand as a lawfully permissi-
ble interpretation of section 303 until changed by Congress.
Chief Judge Markey, author of the majority opinion, first examined
the broad language of Downs and found it to be not binding on the issue
in Zenith: "[TIhat broad language did not constitute a Supreme Court
holding that every non-excessive remission of every excise tax consti-
s8 T.D. 35595, 29 TREAS. DEC. INT. REV. 59 (1915).
59 "A word of broader significance than 'grant' could not have been used. Like its
synonyms 'give' and 'bestow,' it expresses a concession, the conferring of something by
one person upon another. And if the something be conferred ... 'upon the exportation of
any article or merchandise,' a countervailing duty is required." 249 U.S. at 39.
60 See Feller, supra note 13; Butler, Countervailing Duties and Export Subsidization: A
Re-emerging Issue in International Trade, 9 VA. J. INT'L L. 82 (1968).
61 440 F.2d 1024 (C.C.P.A. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971).
62 562F.2dat1222.
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tutes a bounty or grant as a matter of law." 63 The controlling factor in
determining whether a subsidy has been conferred in any given situa-
tion is "neither form nor nomenclature ... [but] the economic result of
the foreign government's action." 64 This is a factual determination for
which the courts are "ill equipped, ' 65 and the Chief Judge concluded
that the "complex economic analyses" required are best left to the
Treasury. 66 Consequently, the administrative practice of not countervail-
ing nonexcessive tax remissions, "if not contrary to or inconsistent with
law," is determinative of the issue inZenith.67
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Miller concluded that the judicial
precedent of Downs, not past administrative decisions, controls any in-
terpretation of "bounty or grant." Furthermore, the judge read Downs as
intending to include nonexcessive remissions in the scope of the coun-
tervailing duty law:
Moreover, since the Supreme Court clearly determined that both
remission of the excise tax and the certificate constituted a bounty,
there were two grounds upon either of which it rested its decision.
Each ground represented the judgment of the court and was of equal
validity with the other. 68
The dissent thus argued that the nonexcessive tax remission for
Japanese exports should be countervailed by law.
The judicial interpretations of "bounty or grant" found in the early
decisions of Downs and Nicholas arguably support either position. The
Downs court clearly intended to broaden the scope of the countervailing
duty law to cover any subsidy by a foreign government, regardless of
whether or not that subsidy was in the form of a nonexcessive tax
remission. In this way the decision reflected the isolationist trade
policies of the early twentieth century. Since that era, however, the
formation of GATT and the liberalization of trade restrictions have sig-
naled a significant shift in the attitudes of the United States and other
nations toward world trade. 69 The Zenith court recognized this shift and
63 Id. at 1215.
64 Id. at 1216.
65 Id.
66 See id.
67 Id. at 1219.
68 Id. at 1228 (emphasis in original).
69 American contributions to the free trade movement include Reciprocal Trade
Agreement Act of 1934, ch. 474, 48 Stat. 943 (1934) which granted to the President the
authority to enter reciprocal agreements lowering trade barriers between the parties. The
Trade Expansion Act of 1962, 76 Stat. 872 (1962), 19 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1991 (1970) further
expanded Presidential authority in negotiations for tariff reductions and created "adjust-
ment assistance" programs for domestic firms and employees harmed by import competi-
tion. Metzger, The Trade Expansion Act of 1962, 51 GEo. L.J. 425, 428-29 (1963). See generally
Schmitthoff, The Unification of the Law ofInternational Trade, 1968 J. Bus. L. 105 (1968); Note,
The Trade Act of 1974; A Fundamental Change in United States Foreign Trade Policy, 80 YALE L.J.
1418-27 (1971).
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was compelled to construe the Downs opinion more narrowly than had
been done in the past. 70
Although the two opinions in Zenith both dealt with the historical
bases for interpreting the statutes, only Judge Miller's dissent discussed
any present congressional intent behind the countervailing duty law.
The judge noted that the amendment to section 516 contained in the
Trade Act of 1974 now provides for judicial review of negative counter-
vailing duty determinations at the instance of U.S. manufacturers and
producers. 71 This change implies that since the Treasury Department
has traditionally refused to countervail nonexcessive tax remissions,
Congress intended the amendment to challenge this administrative
practice and to force the Treasury to abandon its blanket exclusion of
nonexcessive tax remissions from the scope of the countervailing duty
law. 72 Presumably, the result would be a more discriminating examina-
tion of tax remissions to determine the economic consequences of the
particular subsidy in question.
Certainly Congress wanted to increase flexibility in the application
of the countervailing duty law by amending the Tariff Act of 1930. The
inclusion of nondutiable goods in the scope of the law indicates that
tariff levels no longer reflect a purely protectionist trade policy. The
legislators recognized that dutiable goods are not the only source of
injury and that domestic manufacturers not shielded by tariff barriers
nevertheless need protection from unfair competition by foreign sub-
sidized imports. 73 The proof of injury test qualifies this amendment and
precludes an inflexible application of countervailing duties to the duty-
free goods. 74 The Commissioner of Customs must now examine the
competitiveness of each subsidized import in question and determine the
extent to which the domestic industry is or shall be injured as a result of
the failure to countervail. As a result, the administration of the law can be
more sensitive to actual need.
Amended section 516 expands the scope of judicial review of this
administrative practice and presumably creates another check against
the inflexible application of countervailing duties. The Court of Customs
70 "And, as between the bounties involved in Downs, the Supreme Court appears to
have regarded the tax remission practice as constituting the prime bounty." American
Express Co. v. United States, 332 F. Supp. 191, 199 (Cust. Ct. 1971), aff'd on other grounds,
472 F.2d 1050 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
71 See text at notes 38-42, supra.
72 Judge Miller cited a 1972 Senate Finance Committee report as expression of con-
gressional concern over "the ability of American producers to obtain meaningful relief
against subsidized import competition under the Countervailing Duty Law ... because of
administrative inaction or insufficient action ... " 562 F.2d at 1235 n.26, citing S. Rep. No.
1221, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1972) (emphasis added).
73 Competition is considered unfair if the competitive advantage is created by subsidy
rather than by productive efficiency. Thus countervailing duties are generally regarded as
a means of preserving rather than restricting competition. Butler, supra note 60, at 83. See
also Feller, supra note 13, at 19-26.
74 See text at notes 35-37, supra.
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and Patent Appeals acquired jurisdiction in Zenith by way of an appeal
filed pursuant to this section. However, the issue on appeal before the
court was not the Treasury Department's factual determinations as to
the economic consequences of the Japanese tax remission. "On the con-
trary, the sole question on this appeal is whether the mere remission of
the Japanese Commodity Tax must be deemed a bounty or grant as a
matter of law."75 Therefore, the court's decision in this case necessarily
determined the broad issue of whether every nonexcessive tax remission
must be deemed by law a bounty or grant.
The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals' determination of this
broad issue in Zenith directly affects the extent to which the congres-
sional goal of administrative flexibility might be achieved. By interpret-
ing section 303 to include nonexcessive tax remissions, the court would
have considerably diminished the Treasury Department's permissible
range of discretion. When confronted with a tax remission scheme of the
type found in Zenith, the Secretary would then be required by law to
countervail, regardless of the actual economic need for such a measure.
However, by ruling that nothing in section 303, in its legislative history
or in judicial precedent requires that the remission of an excise tax alone
must be deemed a bounty or grant as a matter of law, the court has not
precluded a later determination by the Treasury Department that a par-
ticular nonexcessive tax remission scheme does constitute a bounty or
grant. The Treasury Department's uniform interpretation of the law is
not necessarily the required interpretation, but it is "a lawfully permis-
sible interpretation of section 303."76 The question essentially remains
open to challenge pursuant to section 516 on the basis of the merits of
the individual claim. If such a challenge were made, the courts would be
justified in determining whether the Treasury correctly considered the
economic result of the subsidy in question.
United States trade policy no longer reflects the isolationist
philosophies of the Downs era. Courts today recognize that "countervail-
ing duties are strong medicine, well calculated to cause violent resent-
ment in countries whose trade practices are branded by the court as
unethical." 7 7 This resentment often results in political and diplomatic
retaliation. 78 Furthermore, indiscriminate administration of the law may
well exacerbate any latent resentment in the exporting country, particu-
larly if the countervailed subsidy failed in practice to promote exports to
any significant degree. These dangers prompted congressional action in
favor of more flexible administrative regulations for the countervailing
duty law. The 1974 amendments to the law encourage the Commissioner
75 562 F.2d at 1216.
76 Id. at 1223.
77 Hammond Lead Products, Inc. v. United States, 440 F.2d 1024, 1031 (C.C.P.A.
1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971).
78 See Feller, supra note 13, at 64.
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of Customs to examine the economic realities of a tax remission scheme
and to determine whether the benefit conferred rises to the level of a
bounty or grant under section 303.
The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals preserved this flexibility
in Zenith by narrowly construing the scope of a "bounty or grant" under
section 303. The court ruled against a mandatory inclusion of all nonex-
cessive tax remissions within those terms and opened the way for more
discriminating administrative application of the countervailing duty
law.
The possibility exists that the Treasury Department may view Zenith
as an unqualified validation of the Treasury's uniform exclusion of
nonexcessive tax remissions from the scope of the law. However, the
expanded judicial review available under amended section 516 of the
Trade Act of 1974 should serve to implement the congressional goal of a
more effective administration of countervailing duties. Manufacturers
and producers now have the right to challenge negative determinations
by the Secretary of the Treasury on the grounds that the facts of the
particular situation do not merit such a determination. The Zenith deci-
sion prevented this crucial right to challenge from becoming illusory.
-JOHNSON A. SALISBURY
